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Abstract
At least historically, it was common for medical practitioners to believe causal 
hypotheses on the basis of standalone mechanistic reasoning. However, it is now 
widely acknowledged that standalone mechanistic reasoning is insufficient for appro-
priately believing a causal hypothesis in medicine, thanks in part to the so-called 
problem of masking. But standalone mechanistic reasoning is not the only type 
of mechanistic reasoning. When exactly then is it appropriate to believe a causal 
hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning? In this paper, I argue that it has 
proved difficult to provide a satisfying answer to this question. I also argue that this 
difficulty is predicted by recent work in knowledge-first epistemology. I think this 
shows that recent work in epistemology has important implications for practice in 
the philosophy of science. It is therefore worth paying closer attention in the phi-
losophy of science to this recent work in knowledge-first epistemology.
Keywords Mechanistic reasoning · The problem of masking · Knowledge-first 
epistemology · The philosophy of science
1 Introduction
At least historically, it was common for medical practitioners to believe causal 
hypotheses on the basis of standalone mechanistic reasoning. A famous exam-
ple involves the mechanistic reasoning that led to believing that bloodletting was 
an effective therapy for a variety of diseases (Howick 2011b: pp. 136–137). How-
ever, it is now widely acknowledged that such mechanistic reasoning is insufficient 
for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis in medicine (Russo and Williamson 
2007: 162). After coming to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of such rea-
soning, it remains possible that the putative cause does not make an overall differ-
ence to the relevant effect, because there may exist further so-called masking mecha-
nisms by which the putative cause also cancels out any difference made by way of 
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the established mechanism. This has been called the problem of masking by Phyllis 
Illari (2011).
However, standalone mechanistic reasoning is not the only type of mechanistic 
reasoning in medicine. Some other type of mechanistic reasoning may yet be suffi-
cient for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis in medicine. When exactly then 
is it ever appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic rea-
soning? One answer has been put forward by Jeremy Howick (2011a, b). He thinks 
that it is appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic rea-
soning if and only if the reasoning counts as high-quality mechanistic reasoning, 
where high-quality mechanistic reasoning meets certain completeness and complex-
ity conditions.
In this paper, I argue that high-quality mechanistic reasoning is also insufficient 
for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis in medicine. More generally, I argue 
that it has proved difficult to provide a satisfying answer to the following princi-
pal question: When is it appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of 
mechanistic reasoning? I maintain that this difficulty is predicted by recent work in 
knowledge-first epistemology (Williamson 2000). According to this work, it is sim-
ply not possible to provide a satisfying answer to the principal question. I think this 
shows that recent work in epistemology has important implications for practice in 
the philosophy of science. And I argue that it is therefore worth paying closer atten-
tion in the philosophy of science to recent work in knowledge-first epistemology. I 
hope that this helps to motivate a novel approach in the philosophy of science, an 
approach which insists upon a mutually beneficial interaction with this recent work 
in epistemology.
2  Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking
Historically, it was common for medical practitioners to believe causal hypotheses 
on the basis of standalone mechanistic reasoning, where standalone mechanistic 
reasoning involves believing a causal hypothesis solely on the basis of an estab-
lished mechanism linking the putative cause and effect (Howick 2011b: p. 128).1 
Indeed, a classic defence of standalone mechanistic reasoning in medicine was pro-
vided by Claude Bernard (1865). Of course, this reliance on standalone mechanistic 
reasoning was also not without its critics (cf. Howick 2016). Nevertheless, it was 
still common for medical practitioners to rely on such reasoning in order to believe 
causal hypotheses about the effectiveness of medical interventions at bringing about 
certain health outcomes (Howick 2011b: pp. 154–157). For example, on the basis 
of established mechanisms concerning vomiting and choking, it was believed that 
1 A number of different accounts of the metaphysics of a mechanism have been proposed in the litera-
ture. A nice overview of these accounts is given by Jeffrey Aronson (2020). Given that this paper is more 
concerned with epistemological rather than metaphysical issues, I simply take it that a mechanism is an 




putting babies to sleep on their fronts was effective at reducing infant mortality due 
to sudden infant death syndrome. But observational studies later showed that infant 
mortality rates were in fact reduced by placing babies to sleep on their backs (How-
ick 2011b: pp. 137–138). Such failures led to the recognition that standalone mech-
anistic reasoning is insufficient for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis in 
medicine (cf. Solomon 2015: pp. 121–124).
Why exactly is it inappropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of 
standalone mechanistic reasoning? In part, it is because such mechanistic reasoning 
suffers from the problem of masking. Phyllis Illari (2011) discusses the following 
example as an instance of the problem of masking in action. Although there is an 
established mechanism that links increased exercise to weight-loss by burning calo-
ries, this basis is not enough to appropriately believe the hypothesis that increased 
exercise causes weight-loss, since it remains possible that there exist further mask-
ing mechanisms by which increased exercise leads to weight-gain, for example, by 
increasing appetite (cf. Steel 2008: p. 68). In such a case, in order to appropriately 
believe the hypothesis that an intervention caused some health outcome, it was not 
enough to have believed the hypothesis on the basis of evidence that established only 
that there is a particular mechanism by which the intervention makes a difference 
to that health outcome. After believing the causal hypothesis on the basis of such 
standalone mechanistic reasoning, it remains possible that the intervention does not 
make the relevant overall difference to the health outcome, because it remains pos-
sible that there exists some masking mechanism by which the intervention also can-
cels out any difference made by way of the particular established mechanism. This is 
the problem of masking (Illari 2011: pp. 145–147).
Is the problem of masking really a problem for standalone mechanistic reason-
ing? An analysis of causality in terms of mechanisms has been given by Stuart 
Glennan (1996). According to this analysis, a medical intervention and some health 
outcome are causally connected if and only if they are linked by some appropri-
ate mechanism. In this sense, establishing a mechanism linking an intervention 
and some health outcome simply is establishing a causal hypothesis involving the 
intervention and that outcome. It might therefore be thought that an established 
mechanism does provide a basis for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis. In 
the weight-loss case, evidence that establishes a mechanism linking increased exer-
cise to weight-loss thereby establishes the hypothesis that increased exercise causes 
weight-loss. Given this analysis, it might be argued that this established mecha-
nism is enough to provide a basis for appropriately believing that increased exercise 
causes weight-loss.
However, two types of causal hypothesis have been distinguished by Christo-
pher Hitchcock (2001). The problem of masking depends upon a similar distinc-
tion (cf. Illari 2011: p. 146). On the one hand, there are causal hypotheses that 
claim a component effect for a mechanism. They claim only that there is a par-
ticular mechanism by which the putative cause makes a difference to the effect, 
even if there may be other mechanisms that preclude the putative cause from 
making an overall difference to the effect. On the other hand, there are hypoth-
eses that claim a net effect. They claim that the putative cause does make an 
overall difference to the effect, where this overall difference takes into account 
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all of the mechanisms linking the cause and effect. In the medical context, the 
point of believing a causal hypothesis is often in order to predict the effects of 
interventions, for example, the effect of the increased exercise on weight-loss 
(Russo and Williamson 2011: p. 567). Given this, the relevant causal hypoth-
esis does not concern only the component effect, since a medical intervention is 
beneficial only if it makes an overall difference to a health outcome, rather than 
just a difference along a particular mechanism. In other words, establishing that 
there is a particular mechanism by which the intervention makes a difference to 
the health outcome may be enough to appropriately believe a hypothesis about 
a component effect of the intervention. However, this is not enough to appropri-
ately believe the hypothesis relevant in medicine, which requires also establish-
ing that the intervention has a net effect on the relevant health outcome.
How significant is the problem of masking? Historically, the problem of mask-
ing has proved a significant difficulty in medicine. A number of cases in which 
a harmful or non-beneficial intervention was proposed on the basis of an estab-
lished mechanism have been listed by Jeremy Howick (2011b: pp. 154–157). In 
many of these cases, the problem of masking provides a plausible explanation of 
these unsuccessful interventions. One example here is the controversy regarding 
the benefits of screening for breast cancer with mammography (Solomon 2015: 
pp. 210–217). Miriam Solomon points out that some medical researchers recom-
mended mammography on the basis of the established mechanism that breast 
cancer is a progressive disease, and that therefore the earlier that the cancer is 
detected by mammography then the more effectively the disease may be treated 
(Solomon 2015: p. 212). However, certain systematic reviews of clinical stud-
ies have suggested that mammography leads to no overall reduction in breast 
cancer mortality in certain age ranges [e.g., Gøtzsche and Olsen (2000)]. This 
is sometimes called the mammography paradox (Retsky et  al. 2005). One pos-
sible explanation of this paradox is that any difference to breast cancer mortal-
ity made by screening is being cancelled out by the action of some unknown 
masking mechanism. Indeed, Solomon mentions the hypothesis that ‘the injury 
caused by biopsy produces increased blood flow and stimulates angiogenesis in 
the area, and that this nourishes the cancer and enables it to spread’ (Solomon 
2015: p. 212). This hypothesis has been considered elsewhere as an explanation 
of the mammography paradox (Baum et al. 2005; Retsky et al. 2005).
In conclusion, the problem of masking is a real and significant problem for 
standalone mechanistic reasoning in medicine. It is now widely recognized 
that standalone mechanistic reasoning is therefore insufficient for appropriately 
believing a causal hypothesis in medicine. This fact is perhaps best reflected by 
the positioning of standalone mechanistic reasoning at the bottom of the evi-
dence hierarchy of evidence-based medicine (Clarke et  al. 2014). However, 
standalone mechanistic reasoning is not the only type of mechanistic reasoning. 
Some other type of mechanistic reasoning may yet be sufficient for appropriately 
believing a causal hypothesis, as long as that reasoning satisfies additional con-
straints to standalone mechanistic reasoning.
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3  High‑quality mechanistic reasoning
When is it ever appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanis-
tic reasoning? Given the preceding discussion, a natural answer is that it is appropri-
ate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning if and only 
if the mechanistic reasoning overcomes the problem of masking. However, Howick 
has pointed out an additional problem for certain instances of standalone mecha-
nistic reasoning: ‘the probabilistic nature of mechanistic relationships presents a 
serious problem for inferring the overall effect of an intervention from knowledge 
about mechanisms’ (Howick 2011a: p. 937). In other words, the stochastic nature 
of some mechanisms makes it difficult to infer the overall effectiveness of a medical 
intervention on the basis of standalone mechanistic reasoning, even if that reasoning 
overcomes the problem of masking. Let us call this additional problem the problem 
of complexity.
Howick therefore thinks that it is appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on 
the basis of mechanistic reasoning if and only if the reasoning counts as high-quality 
mechanistic reasoning, where high-quality mechanistic reasoning meets the follow-
ing conditions:
(1) The knowledge of mechanisms upon which the mechanistic reasoning is based is 
not incomplete, i.e., there are no obvious gaps in our knowledge of the inferential 
chain linking the intervention and the patient-relevant outcome.
(2) The probabilistic and complex nature of the mechanisms are explicitly taken 
into account when inferring from mechanisms to any claims that a particular 
intervention has a patient-relevant benefit (Howick 2011b: p. 144)
Let us call the first condition the completeness condition, and the second condi-
tion the complexity condition. The completeness condition is intended to address the 
problem of masking. And the complexity condition is intended to address the prob-
lem of complexity (Howick 2011a: pp. 937–938).
I want to argue that high-quality mechanistic reasoning is also insufficient for 
appropriately believing a causal hypothesis in medicine. I think that there is a coun-
terexample showing that it is possible to inappropriately believe a causal hypoth-
esis on the basis of high-quality mechanistic reasoning. One such counterexample 
concerns the effect of hormone replacement therapy on coronary heart disease (cf. 
Howick (2011a: pp. 927–930) and Solomon (2015: pp. 123–124)). In this case, there 
was extensive mechanistic evidence that hormone replacement therapy reduced the 
risk of complications due to blood clotting by lowering the lipid concentration of 
the blood (Mendelsohn and Karas 1999). In other words, the reasoning in this case 
meets the completeness condition, because the extensive evidence meant that there 
were no obvious gaps in the knowledge of the relevant mechanisms. Moreover, in 
this case there was epidemiological evidence that provided evidence of a net effect 
in order to account for the probabilistic and complex nature of the mechanisms 
involved in the reasoning [cf. Petitti et al. (1987) and Stampfer and Colditz (1991)]. 
In other words, the reasoning in this case also meets the complexity condition on 
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high-quality mechanistic reasoning. However, it was still not appropriate on this 
basis to believe that the hormone replacement therapy lowers the risk of coronary 
heart disease. Indeed, it was surprising to find that a large randomized trial later 
suggested that it was false that hormone replacement therapy lowered the risk of 
coronary heart disease (Rossouw et al. 2002). I think that this surprise was partly 
the result of there being no obvious gaps in the available mechanistic knowledge. 
Here it was the non-obvious gaps that stood in the way of appropriately believing 
the causal hypothesis. And it was this surprise that led to further investigation into 
a non-obvious potential masking mechanism involving age-dependent changes in 
vascular pathology (Dubey et  al. 2005). Given this, it looks like it is possible to 
meet the proposed conditions on high-quality mechanistic reasoning without thereby 
appropriately believing the causal hypothesis, thanks to the possibility of non-obvi-
ous masking mechanisms.
Of course, Howick himself introduced this hormone replacement therapy case as 
an example of failed mechanistic reasoning (Howick 2011a: pp. 928–930). He there-
fore acknowledges that the mechanistic reasoning in this example was not enough to 
appropriately believe the hypothesis that hormone replacement therapy lowered the 
risk of coronary heart disease. Given this, Howick will likely maintain that in this 
case the mechanistic reasoning simply did not meet the conditions on high-quality 
mechanistic reasoning. How exactly did the reasoning fail to meet those conditions? 
One suggestion would be to maintain that in this case there still remained some obvi-
ous gaps in the relevant mechanistic knowledge. But it would then become difficult 
to explain why it was surprising to learn that it was false that hormone replacement 
therapy lowered the risk of coronary heart disease. A better suggestion therefore 
would be to amend the proposed conditions on high-quality mechanistic reasoning 
so that they require not only that there are no obvious possible masking mechanisms, 
but also that there are no non-obvious possible masking mechanisms.
In effect, the suggestion here is to maintain that it is appropriate to believe a 
causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning if and only if that reason-
ing counts as super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning, where super-high-quality 
mechanistic reasoning meets the following conditions:
(1) The knowledge of mechanisms upon which the mechanistic reasoning is based 
is not incomplete, i.e., there are neither obvious nor non-obvious gaps in our 
knowledge of the inferential chain linking the intervention and the patient-rele-
vant outcome.
(2) The probabilistic and complex nature of the mechanisms are explicitly taken 
into account when inferring from mechanisms to any claims that a particular 
intervention has a patient-relevant benefit (cf. Howick 2011b: p. 144)
However, the problem now is that it is difficult to carry out such super high-qual-
ity mechanistic reasoning, since it is difficult to avoid such non-obvious gaps in our 
knowledge of the relevant mechanisms. Here is Miriam Solomon:
A general problem with mechanistic accounts is that they are typically incom-
plete, although they often give an illusion of a complete, often linear, narra-
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tive. Incompleteness is the consequence of there being mechanisms underlying 
mechanisms, mechanisms inserted into mechanisms, background mechanisms 
that can fill out the mechanistic story, and mechanisms that can hijack regular 
mechanisms. That is, there is complex interaction of multiple mechanisms in a 
chaotic and multidimensional system. There are possible hidden mechanisms 
everywhere in mechanistic stories, despite an easy impression of narrative or 
causal completeness. (Solomon 2015: pp. 131–132).
In other words, if it is appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis by mechanis-
tic reasoning only if that reasoning is super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning, it 
would then become next to impossible to appropriately believe a causal hypothesis 
by mechanistic reasoning, thanks to the extent and complexity of the mechanisms 
involved in most medical conditions. Of course, Howick may simply accept that it is 
next to impossible to appropriately believe a causal hypothesis in medicine by mech-
anistic reasoning. Indeed, Howick acknowledges ‘there is much to stand in the way 
of mechanistic reasoning being of high quality since there are limits to our knowl-
edge of bodily mechanisms and their interactions’ (Howick 2011a: p. 939).
However, I want to argue that there is an additional problem with the conditions 
proposed by super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning. I think another counterexam-
ple shows that the conditions on super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning are not 
necessary for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis. Here is an example put 
forward by Howick (2011a, b). It was long ago established that there is a mechanism 
linking a reduction in the size of obstructions in the airway to improved respira-
tory function. More recently, it was established that a type of radiotherapy leads to 
a reduction in the size of large nodular goiters, which are an enlargement of the thy-
roid gland (Nielsen et al. 2006). Altogether then, it had been established that there 
is a mechanism by which radiotherapy improves respiratory function in patients 
with large nodular goiters, since large nodular goiters are simply a type of obstruc-
tion in the airway. Moreover, Howick maintains that in this case the conditions on 
high-quality mechanistic reasoning were satisfied: ‘there are no obvious gaps in the 
mechanistic knowledge linking the intervention with the patient-relevant outcome, 
and the possibility of serious adverse events (complexity) was made unlikely by 
the clinical trials in the various stages of the inferential chain’ (Howick 2011b: p. 
144). He therefore thinks that this is one of the presumably rare cases in medicine 
where the mechanistic reasoning was sufficient for appropriately believing a causal 
hypothesis, namely, the hypothesis that radiotherapy improves respiratory function 
in patients with large nodular goiters: ‘Mechanistic reasoning should therefore allow 
us to conclude that radiotherapy will improve respiratory function’ (Howick 2011b: 
pp. 144–145).
I agree that this radiotherapy case provides a convincing example of appropri-
ately believing a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning. However, 
I don’t think that the reasoning in the radiotherapy case meets the conditions on 
super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning. Indeed, an appeal is made only to the 
conditions on high-quality mechanistic reasoning. Moreover, the researchers in this 
case believed that it was still possible that there existed non-obvious masking mech-
anisms by which the radiotherapy worsened respiratory function, for example, by 
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inducing a swelling of thyroid tissue (Nielsen et al. 2006: pp. 1481–1482, Bonnema 
et al. 2008: p. 3981). As a result, these researchers also thought that the mechanistic 
reasoning available at the time did not provide a basis for appropriately believing 
that the radiotherapy improves respiratory function. Indeed, they were so concerned 
about the possibility of such non-obvious mechanisms that they believed it was only 
appropriate to believe that causal hypothesis once an additional randomized con-
trolled trial had been carried out, where this trial systematically performed tracheal 
imaging and pulmonary function tests in order to provide a direct measure of the net 
effect of the radiotherapy on respiratory function (Bonnema et al. 2007, 2008). Of 
course, Howick’s point is that this later randomized trial was unnecessary, presum-
ably because although non-obvious masking mechanisms were still possible in this 
case, they were sufficiently improbable given the available evidence that their mere 
possibility failed to preclude appropriately believing the causal hypothesis (Howick 
2011a: p. 938). Indeed, if one is committed to the idea that such improbable possi-
bilities do in fact preclude appropriately believing a hypothesis, then it is likely that 
one is also committed to the idea that it is appropriate to believe a hypothesis only 
on the basis of evidence that logically entails that hypothesis. And this latter idea 
is surely overly demanding. Given this, the radiotherapy case is plausibly an exam-
ple where it was appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis by mechanistic reason-
ing even though that reasoning failed to meet the conditions on super-high-quality 
mechanistic reasoning, thanks to the remaining possibility of non-obvious masking 
mechanisms. In other words, the conditions proposed by super-high-quality mecha-
nistic reasoning are not necessary for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis on 
the basis of mechanistic reasoning.
Howick is perhaps more charitably interpreted then as maintaining that it is 
appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis by mechanistic reasoning if and only if the 
reasoning sits somewhere between high-quality mechanistic reasoning and super-
high-quality mechanistic reasoning. But where exactly? A satisfying answer to this 
question will need to propose conditions on appropriately believing a causal hypoth-
esis of the apposite logical strength, namely, strong enough to preclude appropri-
ately believing the causal hypothesis in cases like the hormone replacement therapy 
example, but weak enough to allow for appropriately believing the causal hypothesis 
in cases like the radiotherapy example. However, that is likely to continue to prove 
a difficult task, given the poor track record in attempting to specify such conditions.
Where does all this leave us? At this stage, the take-home message is that it has 
proved difficult to provide a satisfying answer to the principal question: When is it 
appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning? 
On the one hand, the answer that appealed to high-quality mechanistic reasoning 
was unsatisfying, since the proposed conditions on high-quality mechanistic reason-
ing were not sufficient for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis. Those condi-
tions were not strong enough to preclude appropriately believing the causal hypoth-
esis in the hormone replacement therapy case. On the other hand, the answer that 
appealed to super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning was also unsatisfying, since 
the conditions on super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning were not necessary for 
appropriately believing a causal hypothesis. Those conditions were not weak enough 
to allow for appropriately believing the causal hypothesis in the radiotherapy case. A 
1 3
Synthese 
satisfying answer to the principal question will instead propose conditions on appro-
priately believing a causal hypothesis of the apposite logical strength. But specify-
ing such conditions is likely to continue to prove a difficult task. Of course, one way 
to complete this task would be by brute force, that is, to maintain that it is appropri-
ate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning if and only 
if that reasoning is a way of appropriately believing the causal hypothesis. However, 
the result is another unsatisfying answer to the principal question, but this time not 
because the answer proposes conditions of the inapposite logical strength, but rather 
because the conditions it proposes are simply circular. In sum, it has proved difficult 
to provide a satisfying answer to the principal question.
4  Knowledge‑first epistemology
I think that the difficulty with providing a satisfying answer to the principal question 
is predicted by recent work in the knowledge-first epistemology advocated in part by 
Timothy Williamson (2000).
Here is a quick overview of this work. A standard way of thinking in epistemol-
ogy is from within a belief-first framework. This framework takes the presence of 
beliefs as unexplained, and puts forward specific conditions on belief in an attempt 
to explain other epistemological phenomena. In particular, one programme within 
the belief-first framework consists of attempts to appeal to the notion of belief in 
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, where these condi-
tions are specified without making reference to knowledge. In other words, this pro-
gramme attempts to provide a non-circular analysis of knowledge. And perhaps the 
historically most famous example of such a proposed analysis of knowledge is the 
so-called tripartite account, according to which a subject knows a proposition p if 
and only if they have a justified true belief that p [cf. Gettier (1963: p. 121)].
Now, the problem with this programme is that it has proved difficult to provide 
such an analysis of knowledge. Arguably, all proposed analyses of knowledge have 
been subject to counterexamples. On the one hand, for some proposed analyses in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, it has been possible to show that a 
belief may meet the proposed conditions without counting as knowledge. Indeed, 
Gettier showed that the tripartite account of knowledge was incorrect, by present-
ing counterexamples to the effect that a subject’s justified true belief that p was 
not sufficient for that subject’s knowing that p (Gettier 1963). On the other hand, 
when the proposed conditions are made sufficiently strong enough to exclude those 
counterexamples, it has been possible to show that those conditions are then overly 
strong, since they also exclude ordinary cases of knowledge from counting as cases 
of knowledge. That is, there are counterexamples that show that the revised con-
ditions are just not necessary for knowing that p (Williamson 2000: p. 4). It has 
therefore proved difficult to provide an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions of the apposite logical strength. Moreover, Williamson 
maintains that ‘[o]ther analyses are circular rather than false; if someone insists that 
knowledge is justified true belief on an understanding of ‘‘justified’’ strong enough 
to exclude Gettier cases but weak enough to include everyday empirical knowledge, 
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the problem is likely to be that no standard of justification is supplied independent 
of knowledge itself’ (Williamson 2000: p. 4). In other words, it is likely that any 
proposed analysis of knowledge either has the inapposite logical strength, or else it 
has the apposite logical strength, but thanks only to being a circular analysis.
Some have therefore drawn the moral that it is just not possible to provide non-
circular necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge (Williamson 2000: pp. 
27–33). Instead, they think about epistemology from within a knowledge-first frame-
work. They recommend taking knowledge rather than belief as unexplained, and 
they then attempt to explain other epistemological phenomena in terms of knowl-
edge. For example, an attempt can be made to appeal to the notion of knowledge 
in explaining what makes it appropriate to believe a hypothesis: it is appropriate 
to believe a hypothesis on the basis of an instance of reasoning if and only if that 
reasoning is a way of knowing the hypothesis. This is a version of a so-called knowl-
edge norm of belief.2
One version of the knowledge-first framework is therefore committed to the fol-
lowing tenets: (i) that knowledge is the norm of belief; (ii) that it is not possible to 
provide non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. It follows 
from these two tenets that it is just not possible to provide a satisfying answer to the 
question: When is it appropriate to believe a hypothesis? According to the first tenet, 
it is appropriate to believe a hypothesis by some instance of reasoning if and only if 
the reasoning is a way of knowing the hypothesis. But this preliminary answer is 
arguably not a satisfying answer to the question. It immediately prompts the further 
question: When exactly is an instance of reasoning a way of knowing a hypothesis? 
A satisfying answer will therefore involve providing non-circular necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for knowing a hypothesis. However, the second tenet then implies 
that it is just not possible to give such a satisfying answer to this further question, 
because the second tenet maintains that it is not possible to provide non-circular 
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. It is just not possible to provide 
a satisfying answer to the question: When is it appropriate to believe a hypothesis? 
Instead, the knowledge-first approach counsels us ultimately to rest content with the 
preliminary answer to the question: it is appropriate to believe a hypothesis by some 
instance of reasoning if and only if the reasoning is a way of knowing the hypothesis.
According to this knowledge-first approach, it is likewise not possible to give 
a satisfying answer to the principal question: When is it appropriate to believe a 
causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning? By the first tenet, it is 
appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning if 
and only if that reasoning is a way of knowing that causal hypothesis. Again, this 
preliminary answer is arguably unsatisfying. It prompts the further question: When 
exactly is an instance of mechanistic reasoning a way of knowing a causal hypothe-
sis? A satisfying answer will therefore involve providing non-circular necessary and 
2 A full discussion of the knowledge-first approach is beyond the scope of this paper. Further discussion 
is given in Greenough and Pritchard (2009), McGlynn (2014). And further discussion of the knowledge 




sufficient conditions for knowing a hypothesis by mechanistic reasoning. However, 
the second tenet of this knowledge-first approach again implies that it is not pos-
sible to give such a satisfying answer. It is just not possible to provide non-circular 
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing a causal hypothesis by mechanis-
tic reasoning. As a result, this knowledge-first approach predicts that any attempt to 
provide such an answer to the principal question will prove unsatisfying.
Of course, this prediction was borne out in the above discussion concerning 
mechanistic reasoning. It there proved difficult to provide a satisfying answer to 
the principal question: When is it appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the 
basis of mechanistic reasoning? In particular, the appeal to high-quality mechanistic 
reasoning was one attempt to provide a satisfying answer to this question, because 
it attempted to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for appropriately believ-
ing a causal hypothesis by mechanistic reasoning. It maintained that it is appropriate 
to believe a causal hypothesis by mechanistic reasoning if and only if the reason-
ing is an instance of high-quality mechanistic reasoning. But it was argued above 
that high-quality mechanistic reasoning is not sufficient for appropriately believing a 
causal hypothesis, because it is possible to meet those conditions without appropri-
ately believing the relevant causal hypothesis, for example, in the hormone replace-
ment therapy case. An attempt was then made to strengthen the conditions proposed 
by high-quality mechanistic reasoning by appealing instead to super-high-quality-
mechanistic reasoning. But this appeal to super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning 
also failed to provide a satisfying answer to the principal question. In particular, it 
was argued above that super-high-quality mechanistic reasoning is not necessary 
for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis by mechanistic reasoning, since it 
is possible to appropriately believe a causal hypothesis by mechanistic reasoning 
without meeting those conditions, for example, in the radiotherapy case. Of course, 
such counterexamples were inevitable from within a knowledge-first framework. In 
order to provide an answer to the principal question of the apposite logical strength, 
a brute force approach was then entertained, according to which it is appropriate 
to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning if and only if 
that reasoning is a way of appropriately believing the causal hypothesis. However, 
this also provided an unsatisfying answer to the principal question, but this time 
not because the conditions it proposed were prone to counterexamples, but rather 
because it avoided those counterexamples only by proposing conditions that were 
simply circular.
I think this shows that recent work in epistemology has important implications 
for the philosophy of science. In this case, it makes clear a potential blind alley; 
if the knowledge-first framework is correct, then at least one prominent activity 
within the philosophy of science was misguided, namely, the attempt to provide 
non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for appropriately believing a causal 
hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning. Moreover, this activity has seri-
ous consequences: if one wrongly believes that meeting a certain set of non-circular 
conditions is sufficient for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis, then one may 
end up inappropriately believing that hypothesis when they believe those conditions 
to be satisfied. For example, it was argued above that if one wrongly believes that 
high-quality mechanistic reasoning is sufficient for appropriately believing a causal 
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hypothesis in medicine, then one may end up inappropriately believing a causal 
hypothesis about the effectiveness of hormone replacement therapy in lowering the 
risk of coronary heart disease. And if one wrongly believes that super-high-quality 
mechanistic reasoning is necessary for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis 
on the basis of mechanistic reasoning, then one may end up inappropriately not 
believing a causal hypothesis about the effectiveness of radiotherapy at improving 
respiratory function. Instead, the knowledge-first approach counsels us to ultimately 
rest content with the preliminary answer to the principal question: it is appropriate 
to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning if and only if 
that reasoning is a way of knowing that causal hypothesis.
It might be objected that the knowledge-first approach therefore wrongly recom-
mends giving up on trying to answer the principal question. Surely, it’s a mistake 
to give up on trying to answer a question of such importance to medical practice. 
However, I don’t think the knowledge-first approach really does recommend giving 
up on the principal question. Rather, it just counsels us ultimately not to expect a 
completely satisfying answer to that question. In effect, it just recommends for phi-
losophers of science to manage their expectations.3
Now, it might also be objected that the attempt to provide non-circular neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis is not 
exactly a blind alley, because the attempt has resulted in specifying certain neces-
sary conditions for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis on the basis of mech-
anistic reasoning. In particular, it is appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the 
basis of mechanistic reasoning only if that reasoning at least meets the complete-
ness and complexity conditions. And such conditions may be appealed to in provid-
ing an explanation of why an instance of mechanistic reasoning was insufficient for 
appropriately believing a causal hypothesis. However, at best this provides a partial 
explanation, because there is more to be said about why exactly those conditions 
are necessary for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis. Anyway, such partial 
explanations are also available on the knowledge-first approach, because it remains 
possible to specify necessary conditions on knowing a causal hypothesis, and such 
conditions may also be appealed to in explaining why an instance of mechanistic 
reasoning was insufficient for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis. One pos-
sible advantage of the knowledge-first approach here is that it can also provide the 
more complete explanation, since it can explain why a given condition is necessary 
for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis, namely, because it is a necessary 
condition for knowing the causal hypothesis.
A more central objection is that the knowledge-first approach is itself misguided. 
In particular, it might be objected that knowledge is not the norm of belief. One 
worry here is that one’s knowledge is not transparent or luminous, in the sense that it 
is possible to mistake the extent of one’s knowledge (Williamson 2000). It therefore 
becomes difficult to follow the knowledge norm of belief; it is difficult to believe a 
3 A similar point has been made in a different context by John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan (2013). 
They take a knowledge-first approach to argue that it is not possible to provide a satisfying answer to the 
question: ‘What ought one to do, epistemically speaking, when faced with a disagreement?’.
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hypothesis only if one knows that hypothesis, when one cannot always tell whether 
one knows that hypothesis. It may seem overly demanding therefore to maintain that 
it is inappropriate to flout the norm by believing an unknown hypothesis (cf. Haw-
thorne and Srinivasan 2013).
However, an important third tenet of the knowledge-first framework is worth 
mentioning in this respect, namely, the claim that all non-trivial norms for belief 
will be difficult to follow in this respect (Williamson 2000: pp. 222–223). In other 
words, for any non-trivial norm of belief, it is possible to mistake whether one is 
conforming to that norm. In this sense, this difficulty is not a special mark against 
the knowledge norm of belief; all non-trivial norms for belief will be similarly dif-
ficult to follow. Again, this prediction is borne out in the debate about mechanistic 
reasoning in medicine. In particular, Solomon has pointed out that it would be dif-
ficult to follow a norm appealing to high-quality mechanistic reasoning, because ‘[i]t 
is difficult, however, to assess our knowledge of the completeness of relevant mecha-
nisms’ (2015: pp. 122–123). In other words, it is difficult to follow the norm of high-
quality mechanistic reasoning, since our mechanistic evidence is non-transparent. 
Indeed, Solomon thinks that the problem in the hormone replacement therapy case 
was not only that we did not know the relevant complexity of the mechanisms, but 
that also ‘we did not know that we did not know the relevant complexity of mech-
anisms, and thus exaggerated the little evidence there was for expecting hormone 
replacement therapy to reduce cardiac mortality’ (2015: p. 123).
Of course, this falls well short of a conclusive argument in favour of this third 
tenet of the knowledge-first framework. But I am not attempting here a full-blown 
defence of any of the tenets of the knowledge-first framework. This has been done 
elsewhere in large part by Timothy Williamson (2000). A proper appraisal will 
involve close engagement with the relevant arguments on its behalf as they are laid 
out in the epistemology literature. I am content merely to point out some important 
implications of the knowledge-first approach for a prominent recent activity in the 
philosophy of science: if the knowledge-first framework is correct, then at least one 
prominent activity within the philosophy of science is misguided. Given such impli-
cations, I think it is worth paying closer attention in the philosophy of science to 
recent arguments from epistemology to the effect that knowledge is the explanans 
rather than the explanandum. A recent advocate of this approach is Alexander Bird 
(2010). But the approach goes against a current trend in the philosophy of science, 
which attempts to practice independently of results in epistemology. For example, 
John Worrall says that ‘“S knows that p” epistemology … is entirely irrelevant for 
any sort of science’ (Worrall 2007: p. 1019).
5  Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that it has proved difficult to provide a satisfying answer 
to the principal question: When is it appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on 
the basis of mechanistic reasoning? An appeal to high-quality mechanistic reason-
ing was one attempt to provide a satisfying answer to that question. However, I 
appealed to a historical case study involving hormone replacement therapy in order 
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to argue that this answer was prone to a counterexample. I also appealed to a more 
recent historical case study to argue that an answer appealing instead to super-high-
quality mechanistic reasoning was also susceptible to a counterexample. Moreover, 
I argued that this difficulty in answering the principal question is predicted by recent 
work in knowledge-first epistemology. According to this work, it is not possible to 
provide a satisfying answer to the principal question. I think this shows that recent 
work in epistemology has important implications for practice within the philosophy 
of science. It is therefore worth paying closer attention in the philosophy of science 
to this work in knowledge-first epistemology.
Of course, a post-positivist philosophy of science takes it that any epistemologi-
cal framework available to armchair reflection upon imagined cases is likely to prove 
a crude tool for understanding the diversity of methods employed in actual scien-
tific practice (cf. Kuhn (1970)). Instead, epistemological morals should be drawn 
only from a historically-informed philosophy of science: an epistemology fit for sci-
ence pays close attention to individual case studies of actual scientific practice. I 
agree that historically-informed case studies in the philosophy of science provide 
a more down-to-earth testing ground for competing epistemological frameworks. 
Indeed, I have appealed to a case study involving hormone replacement therapy in 
order to draw an epistemological moral about high-quality mechanistic reasoning. 
But an adverse side-effect of this development has been that philosophers of science 
pay less attention to work in recent epistemology. I hope to have shown that recent 
results in epistemology have important implications for the philosophy of science. 
In particular, if the knowledge-first approach is correct, then at least one prominent 
activity within the philosophy of science involves going down a blind alley, namely, 
the attempt to provide conditions for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis 
by mechanistic reasoning. In order to better determine whether such an activity is 
indeed heading down a blind alley, it is worth paying closer attention in the phi-
losophy of science to work in knowledge-first epistemology. I hope that this helps 
to motivate an alternative approach in the philosophy of science, an approach which 
insists upon a mutually beneficial interaction with recent work in epistemology. To 
misquote Imre Lakatos: ‘Epistemology without the philosophy of science is empty. 
The philosophy of science without epistemology is blind’ (cf. (1981: p. 107)).
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